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Why it's not Free Speech Versus Fair Trial
David A. Strausst
It is common to say that criminal defense lawyers today, at
least in highly publicized cases, have to represent their clients
not just in the courtroom but outside the courtroom too. Their
audience is not just the jury but the press and, through the press,
the public at large.1 There is also a debate about whether it is a
good idea to allow criminal defense lawyers to engage in this kind
of public advocacy. Usually the debate is characterized by the
phrase "free speech versus fair trial."' That is, the issue is said to
be a choice between the values of free speech - informing the
public about matters of public importance - and the need to en-
sure that trial proceedings are not unduly affected by pretrial
publicity.'
So far as speech by defense lawyers is concerned, this way of
characterizing the issue is mistaken. Out-of-court advocacy by
criminal defense lawyers should be restricted to some degree, or
so I will suggest. But the issue is not "free speech versus fair
trial." The speech in question is not likely to be very valuable; to
that extent, the "free speech" side of the supposed dilemma is
overstated. By the same token, the threat to the fairness of trials
is probably not that great, at least if that threat is thought to
arise because jurors will be biased by defense attorneys' out-of-
court statements. The real problems lie elsewhere.
The best reason to limit defense attorneys' ability to argue
their cases outside of court is that such limits promote the long-
term interests of criminal defendants as a class. A system in
which it is thought that an important part of a defense lawyer's
job is to be an out-of-court advocate is not a good system for
t Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. I am grateful to the
Lee and Brena Freeman Faculty Research Fund and the Sonnenschein Fund for support.
See, for example, Gentile v State Bar of Nevada, 501 US 1030, 1043 (1991) (opinion
of Kennedy) ("An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom door... A defense
attorney may pursue lawful strategies to obtain dismissal of an indictment or reduction of
charges, including an attempt to demonstrate in a court of public opinion that the client
does not deserve to be tried.").
2 See, for example, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Fair Trial and Free Press
(1968); Edward v Hudon, Freedom of the Press versus Fair Trial: The Remedy Lies with the
Courts, 1 Val U L Rev 8 (1966).
' See, for example, Nebraska Press Assn v Stuart, 427 US 539, 551, 561 (1976).
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criminal defendants. This is because out-of-court statements are
very likely to involve a degree of personal vouching for the defen-
dant by the defense lawyer. Many attorneys who would be will-
ing, or even eager, to defend criminal suspects in court - who
consider that to be an honorable aspect of their calling - will not
be willing to make out-of-court statements that align their own
reputations with their client's. They will represent criminal de-
fendants only if it is understood that making such statements is
not part of their job - that their responsibility is limited to being
the defendant's advocate in the courtroom.
So long as out-of-court advocacy is common, a lawyer who
refuses to speak outside the courtroom will risk damaging her
client's interests by appearing not to believe in the client fully. If
out-of-court statements are allowed, an attorney's refusal to en-
gage in an out-of-court public relations campaign may be taken to
suggest a lack of enthusiasm for the client's case. Similarly, so
long as out-of-court advocacy is considered a permissible and even
desirable part of representing a criminal client, many defendants
in high-profile cases will not want to hire an attorney who is un-
willing to speak to the press - or who speaks carefully, in a way
that shows that the attorney is not vouching for the defendant.
This will not be true across the board; some accomplished crimi-
nal defense lawyers may develop a reputation for being highly
effective even though they do not talk to the press. But so long as
talking to the press is a recognized and usual part of a criminal
defense lawyer's job, many outstanding lawyers who are not
criminal defense specialists may be unwilling to appear to lend
their personal reputation and credibility (or that of members of
that firm) to the client's cause.
For these reasons, lawyers who want to confine their repre-
sentation to the courtroom can have an active criminal defense
practice only if out-of-court advocacy by criminal defense lawyers
is restricted. Only such restrictions can make the practice of
criminal law attractive to large segments of the bar, and can
make those attorneys available to criminal defendants. Since, as
I will argue, out-of-court advocacy is unlikely to be very valuable
either to society or to criminal defendants, there is a case to be
made - even from the point of view of criminal defendants alone
- for limitations on out-of-court advocacy by defense attorneys.
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I. GENTILE V STATE BAR OF NEVADA
The Supreme Court, in Gentile v State Bar of Nevada,4 ap-
proved a state bar rule that restricted out-of-court advocacy by a
lawyer who represented a criminal defendant.' Gentile involved a
criminal prosecution that attracted a great deal of media atten-
tion in the local area (in this case, Las Vegas).' In that sense it
was a high-profile trial, but not the kind of extraordinary case
that attracts nationwide publicity. It would be a mistake to try to
use such an extraordinary "trial of the century" as the model
when thinking about the rules that should govern attorneys' out-
of-court statements; rules should be designed with a more typical
case in mind. But trials that attract a great deal of local publicity
are reasonably common. Cases involving political figures, other
locally prominent individuals, or particularly notorious crimes
are likely to fall into this category. Out-of-court advocacy by de-
fense attorneys is likely to be common in cases in this category.
Gentile, a criminal defense lawyer, was disciplined by the
state bar for making an out-of-court statement on behalf of his
client immediately after his client was indicted.7 The indictment
alleged that the client had stolen cocaine and cash from a safety
deposit vault that was being used by undercover police agents.
At a press conference, Gentile said that the evidence demon-
strated his client's innocence; that the likely thief was a police
detective, whom Gentile named (and whom Gentile strongly sug-
gested was a user of cocaine); and that persons who had offered
evidence against Gentile's client were not credible because they
had been pressured by the police.' Gentile's client was acquitted.
The state bar then imposed sanctions on Gentile for violating a
rule modeled on the American Bar Association Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct 3.6,1 which stated that "[a] lawyer shall not make
an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect
to be disseminated by means of public communication if the law-
yer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substan-
tial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceed-
501 US 1030, 1037 (1991).
Id at 1033.
Id.
Id at 1042, 1045.
501 US at 1042, 1045.
Id at 1033. The ABA rule was amended in response to Gentile to make it clear that
the prohibition applies to any "lawyer who is participating or has participated in the in-
vestigation or litigation of a matter." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6(a)
(ABA Center for Professional Responsibility 1994).
109]
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ing." ° The rule also gave examples of prohibited statements, and
it contained a "safe harbor" provision that described statements a
lawyer could make without fear of violating the rule.1
The Supreme Court overturned the sanctions but approved
the provision of the rule that forbade extrajudicial statements
that have a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding. " 12 A majority of the Court concluded that
the safe harbor provision of the Nevada rule was void for vague-
ness, at least as applied to Gentile. 3 The Court noted that Gen-
tile appeared to have made a conscientious effort to conform his
remarks to the requirements of the rule. 4 But a different major-
ity also held that "the 'substantial likelihood of material preju-
dice' standard applied by Nevada and most other States satisfies
the First Amendment."" The Court stated that the press may not
be prohibited from publishing information that will allegedly
prejudice a trial unless it can be shown that there is a "'clear and
present danger' that a malfunction in the criminal justice system
will be caused." 6 But the Court ruled that the speech of lawyers,
at least during the pendency of a criminal prosecution, does not
receive the same level of protection as speech by the press, be-
cause the lawyer has "a fiduciary responsibility not to engage in
public debate.., that will obstruct the fair administration of jus-
tice." 7
Justice Kennedy, writing for four Justices, disagreed with
this aspect of the Court's ruling. He emphasized that speech like
Gentile's is "classic political speech."" "[Sipeech critical of the
exercise of the State's power lies at the very center of the First
Amendment," he explained. 9 For that reason, he was willing to
'o 501 US at 1060.
Id at 1061-62.
,2 Id at 1063.
'3 Id at 1048-51. The court concluded that the rule was void for vagueness because
an exception providing that a lawyer could "state without elaboration.., the general
nature of the defense" misled Gentile into believing reasonably that he could comment on
the character, credibility, reputation, or criminal record of witnesses without incurring the
risk of discipline. Id at 1048.
501 US at 1051.
,5 Id at 1063.
16 Id at 1070-71, citing, among other cases, Nebraska Press Assn v Stuart, 427 US
539 (1976), and Bridges v California, 314 US 252 (1941).
17 Gentile, 501 US at 1074 ("[Ihe speech of lawyers representing clients in pending
cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for regula-
tion of the press in Nebraska Press Assn v Stuart ... and the cases which preceded it.")
(quoting Nebraska Press, 427 US at 601).
5 01 US at 1034 (opinion of Kennedy).
19 Id.
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uphold the Nevada rule only if it were interpreted to be essen-
tially equivalent to the "clear and present danger" standard used
in reviewing measures that restrict the press."
II. THE VALUE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEYS' OUT-OF-COURT
ADVOCACY
Gentile, following the pattern common to this subject, por-
trayed the issue of defense attorneys' out-of-court advocacy as one
that presents a conflict between the values of free speech and the
need to ensure fair trials. Gentile was sanctioned by the state
bar on the ground that his speech created a "substantial likeli-
hood of materially prejudicing" the trial.2' Justice Kennedy de-
fended Gentile's speech on the ground that it was highly valuable
speech. 2 In fact, speech like Gentile's probably does not pose
much of a threat at all to the fairness of trials - but it's also not
all that valuable.
At first glance, there seems to be much to be said for Justice
Kennedy's position. Gentile engaged in truthful speech about a
matter of significant public concern. Beyond that, his speech was
critical of government officials, and it brought to light arguments
and information that the public otherwise might not have heard.
Ordinarily speech of this kind would be entitled to the highest
degree of protection under the First Amendment; as Justice Ken-
nedy said, "speech critical of the exercise of the State's power lies
at the very center of the First Amendment,"23 and "[p]ublic
awareness and criticism have even greater importance where, as
here, they concern allegations of police misconduct.., or where,
as is also the present circumstance, the criticism questions the
judgment of an elected public prosecutor."24
In principle what Justice Kennedy says seems right, but in
practice there is reason to doubt how much value a defense attor-
ney's speech on behalf of his client will really add to the public
debate. Any restriction on a defense attorney's out-of-court
speech would be limited to the time during which the attorney
was actively representing the client in an ongoing proceeding.25
" Id at 1036.
, 501 US 1030, 1033.
Id at 1034.
2 Id.
' Id at 1035-36.
See Patterson v Colorado, 205 US 454, 463 (1907) (Holmes writing for the Court)
("When a case is finished, courts are subject to the same criticism as other people, but the
propriety and necessity of preventing interference with the course of justice by premature
109] 113
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After a case is concluded, or even after the lawyer is no
longer associated with it, the lawyer would be free to speak as she
wished (except of course to the extent she was disclosing privi-
leged information or breaching some other well-recognized rule).26
She could at that time reveal as much as she wished. Her speech
would probably be taken more seriously by the public, because
she would no longer be seen as a hired spokesperson for someone
trying to escape punishment. It is only speech during the time
when a case is pending, and the attorney is representing the de-
fendant, that presents the danger that I have suggested - the
danger that lawyers will feel compelled to vouch implicitly or ex-
plicitly for their clients. The "value" that is lost is only the value
of that narrowly-defined category of speech.
It is useful to try to spell out exactly the circumstances that
would have to exist for that limited category of out-of-court advo-
cacy by a defense attorney to prove valuable to the larger public
debate. First, the situation would have to be one in which -there
was some form of government abuse that needed to be exposed.
It is, of course, impossible to know with precision just how com-
mon such abuses are. Surely they happen sometimes; surely they
do not happen in every case; between those polar positions, it is
difficult to do more than speculate.
Beyond that, though, out-of-court advocacy by defense attor-
neys will be valuable in exposing government misconduct only to
the extent that that misconduct would not have been uncovered
in a reasonable time through the judicial process. A formal judi-
cial finding of police or prosecutorial misconduct is likely to have
a far greater impact on public consciousness than speech by a
lawyer who is the hired spokesperson for a criminal defendant,
especially because criminal defendants usually have every inter-
est in claiming abuses where none exist. So a prerequisite to con-
cluding that out-of-court defense advocacy is valuable is that
there has been a major failure of the judicial process - that is,
that there is some abuse that will not come to light, or will not
come to light until after much damage has been done, unless the
defense attorney speaks about it outside of court.
Second, out-of-court speech by defense attorneys will have
the kind of effect Justice Kennedy envisions only if the climate of
statement, argument or intimidation hardly can be denied.").
2 See Gentile, 501 US at 1076 (noting that a ban on out-of-court advocacy only post-
pones attorney comments until after the trial); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.6 (cited in note 9) (protecting client confidences).
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opinion is such that the public at large will believe a defense at-
torney's claims of abuse. Out-of-court advocacy is of limited value
if it fails to persuade the public. Moreover, if out-of-court state-
ments are permitted at all, they are likely to be common; it will
often come to be seen as part of a criminal defense attorney's job,
at least in a highly publicized case, to represent her client in the
press. The more common such statements are, the more extreme
they are likely to become, as lawyers try to set their clients apart
in the public mind from other criminal defendants who protested
their innocence and claimed that they were victims of govern-
ment abuses. So Justice Kennedy's defense of out-of-court advo-
cacy supposes that even in a climate in which defense attorneys'
claims of abuse are common, there is a great enough chance that
an attorney could convince the'public that an abuse occurred -
even though the attorney cannot prove it in court (or cannot
prove it until it is too late). This is not a wholly implausible sce-
nario, but it is not likely to occur very often.
Third, in order for out-of-court advocacy to be valuable, it will
have to add something to the public debate. That is, the situation
will have to be one in which no one else - such as the press -
discovers the government abuse on its own. It is true that de-
fense attorneys will have especially good access to information. If
the government is engaging in certain kinds of grievous abuses -
if, for example, the government is fabricating evidence to frame
the defendant - the defense lawyers may be in an especially
good position to know about it, and it may not be easy for the
press to find out about it without help.
Sometimes, though, the press will be almost as able as de-
fense counsel to uncover evidence of abuses. Justice Kennedy
made essentially this point in the course of explaining why Gen-
tile's statements did not present a serious threat to the jury's im-
partiality: he noted that "[miuch of the information provided by
[Gentile] had been published in one form or another... [and t]he
remainder... [was] available to any journalist willing to do a
little bit of investigative work."27
More important, even if out-of-court advocacy is restricted in
some way, a defense lawyer's ability to bring government abuses
to light might not, in fact, be much impaired. The principal
problem with out-of-court advocacy by defense attorneys, as I've
said, is not that the jury will be unduly influenced but rather that
attorneys will be put in the position of having to vouch for their
' 501 US at 1046.
109] 115
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clients. An attorney who speaks off the record, or who releases
information (perhaps on condition that it not be published but
instead be used only for purposes of further investigation)28 will
not be in the position of vouching. If rules could be designed to
permit those forms of communication with the press, while not
placing attorneys in a position where they are expected to wage a
public relations campaign for their clients, then the press's ability
to uncover government abuses is likely to be impaired hardly at
all.
Alternatively it might be possible to fashion a "whistle-
blower" exception to rules forbidding out-of-court advocacy for
cases in which the attorney has raised a plausible charge of seri-
ous unlawful conduct by the government. The more specific the
defense attorney's allegation is, the less likely it is that she will
be thought to be vouching for her client's innocence. For that
reason, out-of-court advocacy by defense attorneys might be lim-
ited in such a way that does not entirely deprive the public of the
valuable speech that attorney had to offer.
In fact, here again it will be very useful - both to criminal
defendants as a class, and to the public's interest in finding out
about wrongful government conduct - if the general practice is
not for defense attorneys routinely to allege, in public statements,
the worst kinds of misconduct by the government. So long as out-
of-court advocacy is the norm, the tendency will be for attorneys
to escalate the claims of government wrongdoing, so as to get at-
tention. The more consistently extravagant the claims of gov-
ernment abuses, the less likely the press and public are to take
them seriously. The interests that out-of-court advocacy is sup-
posed to protect - here, the public's interest in learning about
misconduct in the criminal justice system - may be best served
by limiting such advocacy.
III. Is OUT-OF-COURT ADVOCACY NEEDED TO COUNTER SPEECH
BY THE GOVERNMENT?
While out-of-court statements by defense attorneys may have
the incidental benefit of helping to inform the public about gov-
ernment abuses, attorneys have no professional obligation to in-
form the public. They do have a professional obligation to protect
their clients' interests. This obligation might lead them to make
Of course, if the information is privileged or otherwise confidential, an attorney
could be barred from releasing it. See Seattle Times Co v Rhinehart, 467 US 20 (1984).
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out-of-court statements precisely for the reason that the discipli-
nary rules forbid: to try to influence the people who will end up
on the jury.29 This was one of the acknowledged purposes of the
speech in Gentile."
The chance to influence potential jurors might make speech
valuable to the defendant, but it is not clear that it makes the
speech valuable to society. If anything, such speech may have
negative value because it can pervert the judicial process. The
idea of a trial, or any on-the-record hearing, is to make a decision
on the basis of evidence that is subject to careful standards of re-
liability in an atmosphere that promotes rational deliberation.
Encouraging public debate on issues of guilt or innocence is un-
likely, in the aggregate, to improve that process. As Justice
Black wrote in the leading decision upholding the right to com-
ment on the judicial process: "The very word 'trial' connotes deci-
sions on the evidence and arguments properly advanced in open
court. Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the
use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper."
31
The best argument for allowing speech by defense lawyers in
this situation, however, is that they are trying not to distort the
judicial proceedings but instead to undo a distortion caused by
the speech of the government's representatives. In Gentile, for
example, there apparently had been a stream of information from
government sources, beginning long before the indictment, sug-
gesting that Gentile's client was guilty of the offense. 32 According
to Justice Kennedy, Gentile "explained to the disciplinary board
[that] his primary motivation was the concern that, unless some
of the weaknesses in the State's case were made public, a poten-
tial jury venire would be poisoned by repetition in the press of
information being released by the police and prosecutors."33
In this situation, it might be argued that out-of-court advo-
cacy by a defense lawyer is valuable even if - indeed just be-
cause - it is directed to potential jurors. The value is not that it
contributes to society or democratic government generally, but
precisely that it enhances the chances that the trial will be fair.
This is an inversion of the usual "free speech vs. fair trial" for-
mulation: the claim is that out-of-court speech is valuable, not for
See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 6.3 comment at 70-71 (cited in note
9).
See 501 US 1030, 1064 (1991).
Bridges v California, 314 US 252, 271 (1941).
501 US at 1039-41, 1043.
Id at 1042.
109]
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the reasons that speech is usually valuable, but just because it
will help bring about a fair trial; the alternative to allowing
speech, on this account, is a less fair trial.
While this argument has a realistic ring to it, it also encoun-
ters a number of difficulties. The first is that the argument as-
sumes that out-of-court speech is likely to affect jurors: the gov-
ernment's speech will bias them one way; defense counsel's
speech is needed to undo the bias. But the underlying assump-
tion is doubtful at best. Available studies on the subject suggest
that jurors are able to put aside what they have learned outside
of court and decide the case based on the evidence presented at
trial.34 Indeed, that is one of the arguments frequently advanced
by those who defend attorneys' rights to engage in out-of-court
advocacy: that such speech, however strongly phrased and how-
ever intended, in fact seldom affects jurors and therefore poses no
real danger to the integrity of the trial.35 It is difficult - not im-
possible, perhaps, but surely difficult - to argue simultaneously
that (i) out-of-court advocacy is in general so unlikely to be influ-
ential that it is not a problem; (ii) nonetheless, out-of-court
statements by the government will be sufficiently influential to
create a problem that speech by defense attorneys is needed to
counteract; and (iii) out-of-court speech by defense attorneys will
be sufficiently influential to counteract the government's speech.
There is, however, a more basic problem with the argument
that out-of-court speech by defense attorneys is needed to coun-
teract speech by government sources. It is very unlikely that a
free-for-all in the arena of public relations - in which both the
government and the defense try as hard as they can to influence
potential jurors - will produce good results. Indeed, given the
government's advantages - it usually has more information,
more credibility, and a better chance to win the public's sympa-
thy; it usually is able to begin publicizing its views before the de-
fense; and it generally has more resources to devote to the effort
- an overt public relations battle, if it affects potential jurors at
all, is more likely to benefit the government. In any event, surely
See, for example, Rita J. Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Asso-
ciation Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 Stan L
Rev 515 (1977); Joel H. Swift, Model Rule 3.6: An Unconstitutional Regulation of Defense
Attorney Trial Publicity, 64 BU L Rev 1003, 1031-49 (1984); Robert E. Drechsel, An Al-
ternative View of Media-Judiciary Relations: What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About
the Fair Trial-Free Press Issue, 18 Hofstra L Rev 1, 11-36 (1989). See also Erwin Chem-
erinsky, Lawyers Have Free Speech Rights, Too: Why Gag Orders on Trial Participants Are
Almost Always Unconstitutional, 17 Loy LA Ent L J 311, 312 (1997).
' See 501 US at 1053 (Kennedy writing for a plurality).
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no one would deny that the better solution is to have neither side
seek to predispose jurors. Not only is it in the interests of society
as a whole to have the case decided by what occurs inside the
courtroom and on the record; most of the time, it is in the crimi-
nal defendant's interest as well. Occasionally, popular sentiment
will support a criminal defendant. But it seems safe to say that,
in the great majority of cases, exposure to public opinion is the
last thing a criminal defendant needs.
The problem, of course, is that limiting speech by the gov-
ermnent side may be quite difficult. "The police, the prosecution,
other government officials, and the community at large hold in-
numerable avenues for the dissemination of information adverse
to a criminal defendant, many of which are not within the scope
of ABA Model Rule 3.6 or any other regulation."6 A judge is un-
likely to order dismissal of an indictment, thus possibly freeing a
criminal, because of misconduct by the government attorney, un-
less the misconduct is extremely severe. In all likelihood, the
remedy for out-of-court statements by government attorneys (or
by law enforcement officers, to the extent that they can be effec-
tively controlled by the lawyers) will have to be sanctions im-
posed on the attorneys directly. And that still leaves the possi-
bility that government lawyers could speak anonymously, or oth-
ers on the government side - notably the victims of the crime -
might speak in ways calculated to affect the jurors. Or, of course,
the press itself might attack a defendant without the government
playing a role.
Even if restraints are imposed on all out-of-court advocacy,
then, the defendant may be placed at a disadvantage. Nonethe-
less, a suspect is not completely defenseless in an out-of-court
public relations contest. There may be individuals on the defen-
dant's side - the defendant's family members or other support-
ers - whose speech is not controlled by bar rules or judges' or-
ders.
Also, the press may be less interested in statements that do
not come from the attorneys themselves. The public, and there-
fore the press, may be uninterested in a one-sided debate; or
journalists may have qualms about allowing themselves to be
used by only one side. Speech by both sides might precipitate
more overall publicity and therefore more prejudice to the de-
fense.
Again it may be useful to specify the conditions in which out-
Id at 1056.
109]
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of-court advocacy by a defense attorney is likely to be helpful in
obtaining an impartial jury for the defendant. First, the situation
would have to be one in which the government or the press has
tried to influence the outcome of the trial through extrajudicial
statements. Second, the situation would have to be one in which
the defendant is less likely to win in court if he cannot counteract
the influence of the government's speech outside of court; if the
defendant will win the case in court anyway, no purpose is served
by allowing defense counsel to engage in an unseemly out-of-court
debate with her adversary. Third, the case would have to be one
in which the defense attorney's out-of-court advocacy actually did
counterbalance the other side's speech. If a free-for-all outside
the courtroom is still going to leave the government on top, the
defendant is better off trying to prevent it, rather than securing
his attorney's right to enter into it. And finally, the case would
have to be one in which the judge cannot stop the government
from trying to influence the jury pool, since the ideal outcome is
one in which neither side engages in such tactics.
Such cases may occur, but they seem unlikely to arise. The
best prediction is that out-of-court statements by the two sides
are simply unlikely to have any effect at all on the jury's verdict.
Beyond that, if the defense cannot beat the government in a fair
fight inside the courtroom, it seems unlikely that the defense will
win an almost certainly unfair fight outside the courtroom. If the
defense did prevail in a battle for the hearts and minds of poten-
tial jurors, it might do so only by appealing to prejudices and ir-
rationality. There may be instances in which out-of-court advo-
cacy by defense attorneys is valuable because of its effect on the
venire, but they are likely to be quite unusual. It seems better to
try to achieve a system in which out-of-court advocacy by both
sides is forbidden.
IV. WHY A RESTRICTION ON OUT-OF-COuRT ADVOCACY MIGHT
HELP DEFENDANTS
The usual view, that the question whether to restrict out-of-
court advocacy presents a painful dilemma between the freedom
of speech and the right to a fair trial, is therefore both overstated
and misconceived. Allowing lawyers to speak freely is not likely
to jeopardize the fairness of a trial that often; but restricting
speech, during the time when a lawyer is actively representing a
party to criminal litigation, is not likely to remove much valuable
speech from society. Everyone recognizes that lawyers' speech
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can be restricted while the speakers are in the courtroom.37 No
one would propose that the usual rules of public debate apply
during a trial or other formal proceeding. And no one denies that
lawyers can speak freely, so long as they observe well-established
principles of confidentiality, once the case is over. All that is at
stake is extending some elements of the approach that uncontro-
versially governs trial proceedings to public statements made
during the pendency of the case.
The principal benefit of restricting out-of-court speech by de-
fense attorneys is, as I have said, one that accrues to criminal
defendants as a class. If a lawyer can represent her client effec-
tively without embracing the client's cause outside of court, more
good lawyers are likely to represent criminal defendants. It is
generally recognized in our legal culture that a lawyer's vigorous
defense of a client in the course of legal proceedings does not
mean that the lawyer personally vouches for the client's inno-
cence.38 In principle, one could imagine a world in which out-of-
court advocacy was also seen as just part of a lawyer's job that in
no way reflected the lawyer's personal views. But that is not yet
a widely-accepted feature of our culture. As a result, out-of-court
advocacy by a defense attorney will often, implicitly or explicitly,
align the attorney's reputation and credibility with the client's.
Again, Gentile provides an illustration. The attorney in Gen-
tile planned his public relations strategy with great care. He
sought to stay within the limits of existing ethics rules - that
was ultimately one reason the Supreme Court concluded that
those rules were vague - and, at his press conference, he care-
fully declined to answer questions that he thought would require
him to go beyond what the rules permitted.39 Even so, in re-
sponse to questions, Gentile made the following statements:
[B]ecause of the stigma that attaches to merely being ac-
cused - okay - I know I represent an innocent man ....
The last time I had a conference with you, was with a cli-
ent and I let him talk to you and I told you that that case
Gentile, 501 US 1030, 1071 (1991) ("It is unquestionable that in the courtroom
itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to 'free speech' an attorney has is ex-
tremely circumscribed. An attorney may not, by speech or other conduct, resist a ruling of
the trial court beyond the point necessary to preserve a claim for appeal."). See also Sa-
cher v United States, 343 US 1, 8 (1952) ("[Tlhe rights and immunities of accused persons
would be exposed to serious and obvious abuse if the trial bench did not possess and fre-
quently exert power to curb prejudicial and excessive zeal of prosecutors.").
See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 (cited in note 9).
501 USat 1049, 1049 n2.
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would be dismissed and it was. Okay? I don't take cheap
shots like this. I represent an innocent guy. All right?'
What will happen if this attorney represents a client whom
he does not believe to be innocent? Either he will have to avoid
speaking for the client publicly, even in circumstances that would
otherwise call for it - thus not representing that client as effec-
tively as he had his earlier client - or he will have to misrepre-
sent his views about the client's innocence if he is asked. (It is
inconceivable that he would say that he did not believe his client
to be innocent.) Theoretically, he could refuse to express an
opinion about the client's innocence, and avoid giving any implicit
indication that he personally believed his client to be innocent.
But in a court of public relations - unlike a court of law - that
sort of careful distinction between speaking for the client and
vouching for the client is likely to be seen as reflecting a lack of
belief in the client, thus undermining his case.
CONCLUSION
In short, so long as out-of-court advocacy is permitted, an
attorney who does not engage in such advocacy - or who is per-
ceived to be holding back in her willingness to endorse the client
fully - will be seen as communicating a degree of disbelief in the
client, thus prejudicing the client's case. Some lawyers, of course,
will be willing to press every client's position unreservedly in the
public domain. But other attorneys will not be willing to do that
for every client. And if they cannot do it for every client, they are
likely simply to stay away from the practice of criminal law (ex-
cept perhaps for the truly exceptional case that does engage them
personally). The alternative would be to put themselves in a po-
sition where their reticence about engaging in a public relations
campaign on behalf of a client will be interpreted in a way that
injures the client.
The result will be that criminal defense practice is simply too
unattractive to many lawyers who do not want to be placed in
this position. Thus the overall effect of allowing out-of-court ad-
vocacy on behalf of criminal defendants will be, ironically, to
harm the interests of criminal defendants as a class. Criminal
defendants - and the public interest in fair criminal trials -
have been extremely well served by the principle that an attorney
o Id at 1064 (Rehnquist dissenting in part).
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can defend a suspect in court without in any way having to vouch
for the suspect personally. Restricting out-of-court advocacy will
reinforce that principle. It cannot be said that this is an enor-
mously powerful argument for such a restriction; the value in-
volved is not that great, and many of the empirical links in the
chain of justification are a little speculative. But the stakes here
are not large. The values of free speech (or fair trial) are not
heavily implicated. In this situation, a restriction on out-of-court
advocacy, adopted for this reason, may be the most reasonable
way to proceed.
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